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University of Iowa

Out-group Exploitation
through Depersonalization
in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The experiment examined how salience of out-group membership affects an
individual's tendency to financially exploit an out-group member in a prisoner's
dilemma (PD) game and a monetary bonus allocation task. It also examined the
role of depersonalization of self and others. Half of the research participants played
a PD game to win money with an imaginary opponent, who had a foreign accent,
and the other half did with an opponent, who spoke fluent English. A salient
indication of out-group membership was present in the former (accent) condition,
and it was absent in the latter (control). Participants were also asked to allocate
bonus money between the opponent and themselves. It was expected that: 1)
participants in the accent condition would be more likely to depersonalize self and
others than participants in the control condition; and 2) that participants who
showed a higher level of depersonalization would make more competitive
responses in the PD game and allocate more money to themselves than those who
showed a lower level of depersonalization. The results confirmed the first
hypothesis, but only a part of the second hypothesis. The level of depersonalization
of self and others predicted the nature of the PD game responses, but not bonus
money allocation. Unexpectedly, when the effect of depersonalization was
collapsed, the presence of the accent produced a higher level of cooperation in the
PD game.

Economic inequality has always existed in
nations across the globe, rich and poor, never
vanishing despite some effort and improvement
over the last fifty years (Todaro & Smith, 2003).
In reality, as social groups compete over limited
resources, certain dominant social groups often
enjoy more favorable resource allocations than
the rest. The present study intended to
demonstrate that financial exploitation of out-

group members in a situation where individuals
are inclined to obtain a high reward is more
likely to occur as an out-group membership cue
is highly available. Also, it intended to
understand underlying psychological processes
and specifically investigated a role of
depersonalization as a possible mediator of the
phenomenon.
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In-group favoritism observed in the minimum
In-group Favoritism
group paradigm has been explained by social
Prior research indicates that individuals tend
identity theory (Turner, 1985). According to the
to favor their own group (i.e. in-group) when
allocating rewards in an inter-group setting even theory, an individual's self-concept is
constructed by both personal identity as a unique
when such groups tend to be temporary and
individual and social identity as a certain group
arbitrary in nature (Brewer & Silver, 1978;
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Tajfel et member. In order to enhance one's own social
al. (1971) designed a particular setting called the identity, individuals often adopt categorization of
people into groups and are motivated to
minimal group paradigm according to the
differentiate their own groups from the other
following criteria: 1) no face-to-face interaction
groups in favor of their own groups by social
takes place among participants within and
comparison (Brewer, 1979; Turner, 1985;
between groups, 2) a group member is kept
Yamagishi et al., 2005). Particularly in the
anonymous, 3) there is "no instrumental or
minimal group paradigm, where allocation of
rational link between the criteria for inter-group
payoffs in a given matrix is the only means
categorization and the nature of ingroup and
available for social comparison among different
outgroup responses" (p. 154), and 4) responses
groups, individuals actively seek to differentiate
measured do not represent any utilitarian values
their in-group from the out-group by maximizing
to participants. Tajfel et al. (1971) randomly
"relative gain" in favor of the in-group
divided subjects into groups according to an
"over-estimate" and an "under-estimate" (p. 155) (Yamagishi et al., 2005).
of dots projected on the screen, or "preferences
Salience of Categorization
between paintings of 'two foreign modern
Brewer (1979) reviewed various experimental
painters, Klee and Kandinsky"' (p. 165).
studies, which reported in-group favoritism
According to the "multiple-choice allocation
between groups arbitrarily created in a
matrices" (Brewer, 1979, p. 310) adapted by
Tajfel et al. (1971), participants favored a choice laboratory, and concluded that salience of interthat maximized payoffs for the in-group over the group categorization ultimately determines the
level of in-group favoritism. A few other factors
choice that maximized payoffs for both groups.
such as interdependence (e.g. inter-group
Moreover, these participants were most likely to
competition), similarity between groups, and
attempt to maximize the difference in payoffs
difference in status of groups, indirectly
between the in-group and the out-group (i.e.
influence in-group favoritism by affecting
"relative gain"). Brewer and Silver (1978)
salience of inter-group categorization and the
pointed out that some choice alternatives that
maximized "relative gain" were confounded with distinction between the in-group and the outgroup (Brewer, 1979). For instance, Turner
"absolute (in-group) gain" (Brewer, 1979,
p. 310) in the matrix adapted by Tajfel et al., and (1985) found that the order in which two
different allocation tasks in the Tajfel et al.
used their "forced-choice allocation matrices"
allocation matrix were performed affected the
(Brewer, 1979, p. 311), which eliminated the
level
of self-favoritism by influencing salience of
confound. They randomly divided subjects into
inter-group categorization. Participants who first
groups following an "aesthetic preference test"
allocated
payoffs between self and another
(Brewer & Silver, 1978, p. 394), and confirmed
participant showed moderate favoritism toward
that even when other alternatives were
self
whether another participant was an in-group
simultaneously available, individuals dominantly
chose point allocations that maximized "relative member or not. On the other hand, participants
who first allocated payoffs between two other
gain" in favor of their own group (i.e. in-group)
participants, another in-group member and an
over absolute in-group gain, equal gain, or joint
out-group member, and then allocated payoffs
gain between the in-group and the out-group.
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instead of each individual (Postmes, Spears, &
Lea, 2002; Turner, 1987; Van Prooijen & Van
Knippenberg, 2000). When an individual
depersonalizes self and others relying on group
memberships, he or she views self and others
more as group members and less as unique
individuals. As a consequence, perceived
interpersonal differences within his or her own
group (i.e. in-group) and within the relevant outgroup will both diminish, and perceived
similarities between self and in-group members
and perceived differences between self and outgroup members will both increase (Postmes et
al., 2002; Turner, 1987;Van Prooijen & Van
Knippenberg, 2000). Postmes et al. (2002)
manipulated depersonalization in terms of
anonymity and found that depersonalized
interaction in non-face-to-face computer
communication as opposed to individuated
interaction increased perceived inter-group
differentiation and group stereotypes. As we
have seen, it has been frequently argued that
salience of inter-group categorization directly
(e.g. Brewer, 1979) or indirectly (e.g. Kramer,
1991) affects in-group favoritism. However,
there is little research directly linking
depersonalization of self and others to in-group
favoritism in terms of financial exploitation of
out-group members. We investigated if
depersonalization of self and others would lead
individuals to act more competitively toward
out-group members in interdependent resource
allocation such as a prisoner's-dilemma game.

between self and another participant showed
significantly higher self-favoritism when another
participant was an out-group member than an ingroup member. By performing the first allocation
task, the inter-group distinction was made more
salient for the latter participants, which led to an
increase in their in-group favoritism (Brewer,
1979; Turner, 1985).
Kramer (1991) proposed a "general model of
inter-group relations in organizations" (p. 213)
by summarizing findings of many studies, which
showed that inter-group categorization increases
competitive responses among individuals in
interdependent resource allocation (e.g. Kramer
& Brewer, 1984). According to the model,
salience of inter-group categorization influences
perceived interdependence in terms of resource
scarcities by affecting individuals' motives,
perceptions and expectations, and the perceived
interdependence will directly determine
individuals' decisions to behave cooperatively or
competitively with out-group members.
Salience of Out-group Membership and
Depersonalization
The present study manipulated presence or
absence of out-group membership in terms of a
social enduring category such as nationality.
Instead of being explicitly told that they were
belonging to a certain group as in many
minimum group paradigm studies, participants
played a prisoner's-dilemma (PD) money
winning game with an imaginary opponent, who
happened to have a foreign (Japanese) accent or
not. In the accent condition, it was apparent to
the participants who were the U.S. natives that
their opponent belonged to a different group (i.e.
out-group) in terms of nationality. In the nonaccent (control) condition, on the other hand, the
manifest out-group membership cue was absent.
It was expected that the presence of salient outgroup membership would produce greater
perceived inter-group categorization, which
would lead individuals to depersonalize self and
others. According to Turner's self-categorization
theory (1987), depersonalization is a perception
of self and others based on group memberships

Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game
In a typical PD game matrix, incentives to
"compete" or "cooperate" coexist among both
players (Besanko & Braeutigam, 2002, p.610612). When presented with a matrix, two players
make decisions independently and
simultaneously, and each decision affects
outcomes of payoffs awarded to each player. The
dilemma is that although to "compete" has some
short term benefits, in the long term, the
collective profit of both players will be
maximized if both choose to "cooperate" across
trials. Through repeated number of trials, it is
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towards other group members" (p. 175) based on
the existence of a "schema of an out-group---learned beliefs or expectations that inter-group
relations are competitive, unfriendly, deceitful,
and aggressive" (p. 175). Yamagishi et al. (2005)
manipulated presence or absence of mutual
knowledge of group identity between a
participant and his or her opponent in a PD
game. In the "mutual knowledge condition" (p.
178), both a participant and his or her opponent
knew whether they belonged to the same group
or different groups in terms of nationality
(Japanese or Australian), while one participant
knew it but his or her opponent did not in the
"unilateral knowledge condition" (p. 178). Both
Japanese and Australian participants were
employed, and for Japanese participants,
Japanese participants were in-group members
and Australians were out-group members and
vice versa for Australian participants. Every
participant played a PD game with five different
opponents, and two of the five opponents were
in-group members, while other two were outgroup members. A participant had "mutual
knowledge" with one of the two group members
(in the in-group or the out-group respectively)
Alternative Theory: Group Heuristic?
and "unilateral knowledge" with the other one of
the group members. Nationality of one opponent
Yamagishi and his colleagues proposed a
was not known to participants. The PD game
heuristic" or a "naïve theory of groups"
(Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Jin, Yamagishi, &
used in their experiment did not involve a
standard payoff matrix such as in the present
Kiyonari, 1996; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, &
study. Instead, a participant was asked to
Shinotsuka, 1993; Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi,
Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, determine how much of the initial endowment
1998; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi et (AUD 1.00 or 100 yen) he or she would give to
the opponent. The amount of money that a
al., 2005, p. 174) as an alternative explanation
for in-group favoritism in the minimal group
participant decided to give to the opponent
paradigm. According to them, the "group
would be doubled and given to the opponent and
similarly, the amount of money that the opponent
heuristic" represents "a set of beliefs or
expectations that in-group relations will be
offered would be doubled and given to the
participant. The level of cooperation for each
cooperative, friendly, truthful, and peaceful"
(Yamagishi et al., 2005, p. 175), and their theory trial was measured with the amount of money
suggests that individuals behave favorably
that a participant gave to the opponent.
Yamagishi et al. (2005) found that the "mutual
toward their own group (i.e. in-group) members
knowledge" produced significantly higher levels
only when such beliefs or expectations are
mutually shared between the interacting parties.
of cooperation among both Australian and
Japanese participants than the "unilateral
Yamagishi et al. (2005) added that the "general
knowledge" when the opponent was an in-group
heuristic applies also to one's own behavior
possible for both players to continue being
cooperative over time and establish a higher
likelihood of a cooperative outcome (Besanko &
Braeutigam, 2002). Nevertheless, an incentive to
compete would never be zero. In extremity,
Axelrod (1990) explains no incentives to
cooperate will emerge among two egoist players
without a central authority until they play the PD
game an "indefinite unknown number of
times"(p. 294-314). In the present experiment,
due to the time constraint of the experiment,
participants made a response to the PD money
winning game for a single trial. Since the history
of each player's responses in the past trials is
crucial in order to establish a base level of trust,
all participants were asked to imagine that they
had been playing the PD game with a given
individual for six trials and that they had made
cooperative responses on the last four trials.
Then they were asked to make a response for the
seventh, final trial. Since the participants'
decisions were made within a limited number of
trials in the hypothetical setting, an incentive to
compete for the trial was expected to be at least
larger than zero.

"group
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in a PD game played with an out-group member
and allocate less of earned monetary bonus to her
than participants who exhibited lower scores of
depersonalization, and that 3) when
depersonalization scores were controlled, no
differences in individuals' responses to the PD
game and the reward allocation would be
observed between the accent and the non-accent
conditions.

member, but the knowledge manipulation
exerted no effects when the opponent was an
out-group member. The findings confirmed their
hypotheses and demonstrated that the "group
heuristic" accounted for in-group relations
beyond the minimum group setting.
Nevertheless, it is unclear why their theory was
not applied to inter-group relations, that is,
individuals' behavior toward out-group
members, in their hypotheses and the results. It is
contradictory to their earlier notion on the
existence of "schema of an out-group," which
should be reflected in individuals' behavior in
the inter-group interaction.
The present study did not intend to test the
"group heuristic" theory, and all participants
played a PD game with a given individual 'Kim'
in a hypothetical setting. A salient indication of
out-group membership of 'Kim' in terms of
nationality was present or absent depending on
the accent conditions, and "mutual knowledge"
of group membership between a participant and
`Kim' was absent in the two accent conditions.
Also, the standard payoff matrix was used for the
PD game, and the history of their responses in
the past trials was told to participants in order to
control the base level of trust.

Method
Participants
Participants were 99 Introductory Psychology
students at the University of Iowa (43 men and
56 women) who participated in the experiment
as one means of fulfilling a course requirement.
Among them, 50 participants (20 men and 30
women) were assigned to the accent condition
and 49 participants (23 men and 26 women)
were assigned to the control condition.
Procedure
Each participant faced a computer equipped
with headphones and the entire experiment was
carried out by a computer program. Participants
were randomly assigned to two conditions:
accent or non-accent (control). The experiment
was introduced as following:
This experiment concerns how your
knowledge about other persons' opinions and
personality affects your way of interacting
with them. You will obtain some information
about a few people and then we will have
you try and report how you would interact
with them in a risk-game setting. This
experiment uses a role-play technique, that
is, we will have you imagine how you would
react to certain of these other people in a
certain setting.

Hypotheses
The present study aimed to demonstrate that
the more salient out-group membership was, the
more likely individuals would be to exploit an
out-group member in a PD money winning game
and monetary bonus allocation. In addition, it
aimed to examine whether depersonalization of
self and others would mediate the effects. In
other words, it was expected that salient outgroup membership would lead to more
depersonalization, which would lead to monetary
exploitation of an out-group member. Therefore,
it was hypothesized that: 1) participants in the
accent condition would show greater
depersonalization than participants in the nonaccent (control) condition, that 2) participants
who exhibited higher scores of depersonalization
would be more likely to choose a competitive
response (as opposed to a cooperative response)

1. Manipulation of out-group membership
presence
In the experiment, participants first listened to
four females (named `Anne,' Kim,"Sue,' and
`Lynn') exchange their opinions about premarital
sex in an audio taped discussion. The audio
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discussion was introduced to participants as
following:
In order to give you some idea of opinions
and personalities of others, we would like
you to listen to a discussion held by four
female students. You can assume they are
all from the University of Iowa. They will
be exchanging their opinions about dating,
romance and sex. The names of the four
students are Anne, Kim, Sue, and Lynn.
Each person will start talking after
indicating her name each time, so please
pay attention to who is speaking as well as
what the person is saying. The discussion
will be played only once, so please listen
carefully. Later, you will be asked to
imagine how you would react when
interacting with one of these women.

across conditions. Presence or absence of salient
out-group membership in terms of nationality
was manipulated by accented English. In the
accent condition, 'Kim' and `Sue' spoke with an
Asian (Japanese) accent, while `Anne' and
`Lynn' spoke fluent English. In the non-accent or
control condition, all four females spoke fluent
English. In other words, given that the majority
of participants consisted of Caucasian U.S.
natives, salient out-group membership of `Kim'
and 'Sue' was present in the accent condition,
while it was absent in the control condition.
Ideally, the part of 'Kim' and 'Sue' in the script
could have been read by the same individuals so
was the part of `Anne' and `Lynn.' However,
artificiality of an accent would have caused a
great concern in the case, and therefore, two
American women read the part of `Kim' and
`Sue' for the control condition in the recording,
while two Japanese women read them for the
accent condition. Two other American women
read 'Anne' and 'Lynn' and the exact same audio
recorded for their part was used for both
conditions.

In the beginning of the audio discussion, each
of the four females briefly introduced their name
and background, such as where they were from.
`Anne' mentioned that she was from Iowa City,
while 'Lynn' mentioned that she was originally
from California and moved to Iowa City a few
years ago. 'Kim' and 'Sue' mentioned that they
had experience living abroad until they moved to
Iowa a few years ago. Following the
introduction, the script was written in a way
where two females, 'Anne' and 'Lynn,'
expressed liberal attitudes toward premarital sex
(e.g. "...individuals' freedom to express love and
passion so long as they accept the responsibility
for their choice should be more permitted."),
while the other two females, `Kim' and `Sue,'
expressed conservative views (e.g. "Having sex
with numerous partners will create a great risk to
young people's health and future..."). Assuming
that the majority of students at the University of
Iowa possessed liberal attitudes toward
premarital sex, it was expected that `Anne' and
`Lynn' would be perceived by participants as
relatively more similar to themselves than `Kim'
and 'Sue.' The exact same script was used in the
two accent conditions and thus, the extent of the
different attitudes toward premarital sex
expressed by the four females was held constant

2. Dependent measurement: PD game and bonus
money allocation
After hearing the audio-discussion,
participants played a PD money winning game
with `Kim,' one of the four females they listened
to, in a hypothetical setting, and they were asked
to imagine the following situation:
You are about to participate in a game with
one other person. This person will be one
of the women from the discussion you just
listened to. In this game, assume you have a
chance to win a substantial amount of
money. In this vein, your goal is to win as
much money as you can. The person who
you will play the game with will be
randomly selected out of the four female
students in the discussion you just heard.
Although participants were told that their
opponent for the PD game would be randomly
selected among the four females, all
participants actually played the game with
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`Kim.' Next, participants heard a short
introduction spoken by 'Kim.'
So you will get a better feel of this game,
you will hear a short introduction from the
person you will be playing with.
(`Kina' spoke,) "Hi I am Kim. I am a
student here at the University of Iowa. I am
from Des Moines. My family has lived
there for about five years. Before that, we
lived abroad."

The information on the past trials was given to
the participants to establish the baseline control
of trust among the two players:
Please also imagine Kim and you already
have been playing this game six times. In
the first two trials, both of you chose B,
and therefore you two earned $15
respectively, which is indicated by the lineshaded cell (the right at the bottom) in the
matrix below (see Figure 2). On the last
four trials, both of you chose A, and
therefore you two earned $100 respectively,
which is indicated by the dot-shaded cell
(the left at the top) in the matrix (also see
Figure 2).

In the accent condition, this part was
intended to remind the participants of the accent
of 'Kim.' Following the introduction, the rules
of the PD money winning game were explained:
In this money-winning game, both you and
Kim will be choosing between two options,
A and B. Each option awards a certain
amount of money to you and to Kim.
However, the exact amount of money you
will get depends on Kim's choice as well as
your own. At the same time, the exact
amount of money Kim will get depends on
your choice as well as hers. The amount of
money awarded to each of you according to
the responses you and Kim will make is
determined as following:
If you choose A and Kim chooses A, you
will get $100 and Kim will get $100.
If you choose A and Kim chooses B, you
will get $10 and Kim will get $500.
If you choose B and Kim chooses A, you
will get $500 and Kim will get $10.
If you choose B and Kim chooses B, you
will get $15 and Kim will get $15.

The participants were asked to make a response
A or B for the seventh trial in the hypothetical
setting:
And this is the seventh and final trial of
the game. Your goal is to win as much
money as you can. Please choose your
response A or B.
The PD game response "A" was coded as
"cooperative = 1" and the response "B" was
coded as "competitive = 2" as a first dependent
variable.
After participants made their responses to the
PD game, they were further instructed to imagine
the following hypothetical situation, where they
received bonus money worth U.S. $100 and had
the right to allocate it between self and 'Kim.'
After playing multiple rounds of the
previous game, you have earned $945 U.S.
dollars and Kim has earned $845 U.S.
dollars. The experimenter comes in and
announces that you and Kim have earned
$100 bonus dollars based on your collective
earnings. Because you earned more than
Kim, you get to decide how this $100 will
be distributed between Kim and yourself.

The choice matrix, which summarized the
combination of the responses and the amount of
money awarded to a participant and 'Kim' as in
Figure 1, was shown to participants. Each
participant was told to imagine that he or she and
`Kim' were facing the same choice matrix and
assume that they could not talk with each other
before making any response. Furthermore, they
were asked to imagine that they had already
played the game with 'Kim' six times and largely
made cooperative responses (the response A).

The choice matrix that depicted eleven possible
allocations of the money (see Figure 3) was
shown to participants and they were asked to
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choose the amount of money they would want to
allocate to themselves:
Eleven possible monetary distributions of
the $100 bonus dollars between Kim and
yourself in this hypothetical situation are
shown (in Figure 3). The amount of money
each of you will get is shown from the left
to the right. The amount of money Kim will
get is shown in a row at the top, and the
amount of money you will get is shown at
the bottom. For example, when Kim gets
$100 you will get $0 (the far left option),
and when she gets $0 you will get $100 (the
far right option).
To distribute the money between Kim and
yourself, please choose one option. Please
click on one of the icons below, which
indicates a monetary distribution.

The twenty statements consisted of five
statements spoken by each one of the four
females. In the audio taped discussion about
dating, romance, and sex, two females (`Anne'
and 'Lynn') represented liberal opinions about
premarital sex, while the other two females
(`Kini' and `Sue'), who had an accent in the
accent condition, represented more conservative
views. If participants depersonalized the four
females, they would process information
according to group-based categories. As a
consequence, intra-group recall errors or
confusion within a group would increase relative
to inter-group recall errors or confusion between
groups (Postmes et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 1978).
Specifically, they would show more confusion to
recall "who said what" between 'Anne' and
`Lynn' or between 'Sue' and 'Kim,' if they
processed information in a depersonalized
manner. The depersonalization score was defined
as a percentage of intra-group recall errors in
total errors that were made by each participant.

The amount of money the participants chose to
allocate to themselves was recorded as a second
dependent variable.

b) Explicit measurement: Intra-group
variability
When an individual depersonalized others,
perceived "intra-group variability" would
decrease (Postmes et al., 2002; Turner, 1987; Van
Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000, p. 70). In
other words, perceived similarity within a group
or between the same group members would
increase, while perceived similarity between
groups or different group members would
decrease. Thus, intra-group variability was
measured in terms of perceived similarity and
difference between two females among the four
(Anne, Kim, Sue, and Lynn). Perceived
similarity was measured with the question "To
what extent do you anticipate (e.g. Anne and
Kim) will be similar in terms of most of their
general social attitudes?" Perceived difference
was measured with the question "To what extent
do you anticipate (e.g. Anne and Kim) will be
different in terms of most of their general social
attitudes?" Both types of questions had a 7-point
scale that ranged from 1= not at all to 7= very
much (cf. Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995;

3. Depersonalization measurement
Depersonalization of self and others was
measured in the end of the experiment.
1) Depersonalization of others
First, the level of depersonalization of others,
i.e. the extent to which participants
depersonalized the four females in the audio
discussion, was measured by (a) implicit
(Postmes et al., 2002; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, &
Ruderman, 1978) and (b) explicit (Van Prooijen
& Van Knippenberg, 2000) measurement.
a) Implicit measurement: Who said what
Following the bonus money allocation task,
participants were given a recall test called "who
said what" (Taylor et al. as cited in Postmes et
al., 2002, p. 11). Twenty statements from the
audio discussion that was heard in the beginning
of the experiment were shown to participants in
a randomized order. Participants were asked to
identify who said each statement among the four
females, `Anne,' Kim,"Sue,' or 'Lynn.' They
were instructed to guess if they were uncertain.
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as a perceived similarity score between self and
in-group members for each participant.
ii) Perceived similarity between self and outgroup members ( `ICim' and `Sue). Similarly,
perceived similarity scores between self and
`Kim' and between self and 'Sue' were first
combined (averaged) with reversed perceived
difference scores respectively, and then averaged
altogether as a perceived similarity score
between self and out-group members.
Following the depersonalization
measurement, participants answered the question
regarding each one of the four females, "How
confident do you feel (e.g. Anne) was when
stating her opinions?" on 7-point scales (1= not
at all, 7= very much). The final questionnaire
item asked participants to provide their ethnic
background. When the study was over,
participants were thanked for their participation
and debriefed about the experiment. Following
the debriefing, the experimenter asked them
whether they noticed an accent in the audiodiscussion or not (only for those in the accent
condition), whether they understood the PD
game instructions or not, and whether they had
any suspicions about the study during the
experiment or not.

Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997; Van
Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000).
i) Perceived similarity within a group. It was
measured with the perceived similarity and
difference questions regarding the two pairs of
individuals, who belonged to the same group:
{Anne and Lynn} and {Kim and Sue} . Perceived
similarity scores, which were first combined
(averaged) with reversed perceived difference
scores for each of the pairs, were averaged
altogether.
ii) Perceived similarity between groups. It
was measured with the perceived similarity and
difference questions regarding the other four
pairs of individuals, who belonged to different
groups: {Anne and Kim}, {Anne and Sue},
{Kim and Lynn}, and {Sue and Lynn} . Scores
were computed by the same method as perceived
similarity within a group.
2) Depersonalization of self
Second, the level of depersonalization of self
was measured with explicit measurement (Van
Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000). If an
individual depersonalized self, perceived
similarity between self and an in-group
member(s) and perceived dissimilarity between
self and an out-group member(s) would increase
(Postmes et al., 2002; Turner, 1987; Van Prooijen
& Van Knippenberg, 2000). Perceived similarity
between self and one of the four females in the
audio-discussion was measured with two types
of questions that had 7-point scales as previous
questions: "I expect I will be different from (e.g.
Anne) in terms of most of general social
attitudes" (reverse scored); and "I expect I will
resemble (e.g. Anne) in terms of most of general
social attitudes." (cf. Simon, Pantaleo, &
Mummendey, 1995; Van Prooijen & Van
Knippenberg, 2000).
i) Perceived similarity between self and ingroup members (`nne' and 'Lynn). Perceived
similarity scores between self and 'Anne' and
between self and 'Lynn' were first combined
(averaged) with reversed perceived difference
scores respectively, and then averaged altogether

Results
Manipulation check
All participants assigned to the accent
condition reported that they noticed accent in the
audio-discussion. In the non-accent (control)
condition, participants perceived 'Anne' and
`Lynn' as relatively more similar to themselves
(M= 4.07, SD = 1.21) than 'Kim' and 'Sue'
(M= 3.68, SD = 1.28), however, the mean
difference was not significant (p = .24). In the
accent condition, participants perceived 'Anne'
and 'Lynn,' who were the in-group members in
terms of their nationality, significantly more
similar to themselves (M= 5.29, SD = 1.24) than
`Kim' and 'Sue,' who were the out-group
members (M= 2.76, SD = 1.25, t (49) = 7.64,
p <.001). Confidence level of `Kim,' Sue,' and
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`Lynn,' which was perceived by participants
from the audio discussion respectively, did not
differ across conditions. Although the exact same
audio was used for the part of 'Anne,' she was
perceived to be more confident in the accent
condition (M= 5.76) than the control condition
(M= 5.12, t (97) = 2.31,p <.05).

rate was not equal across conditions, a mean
percentage of intra-group errors in total errors
(i.e. the total number of intra-group errors
divided by the total number of errors) was
computed for each condition and compared. The
mean percentage of intra-group errors among
participants in the accent condition was 76%,
and it was significantly higher than 33%, the
percentage of intra-group errors by chance
(M= .76, SD = .17, t (49) = 17.93,p <.001). The
mean percentage of intra-group errors among
participants in the non-accent condition was
54%, and it was also significantly higher than
33% (M= .54, SD = .27, t (48) = 5.31,p <.001).
Therefore, participants in both conditions
showed a significant level of depersonalization
measured by the types of errors in the recall test.
However, as expected, the mean percentage of
intra-group errors made by participants in the
accent condition was significantly higher than
the non-accent condition (t (97) = 4.77,p <.001).
An ANOVA, which compared the number of
intra-group errors across conditions, controlling
the total number of errors, yielded the same
result (F = 12.65,p <.001). Therefore,
participants in the accent condition were more
greatly confused between the same group
members, recalling what they said, compared to
participants in the non-accent condition. In other
words, participants in the accent condition
showed higher depersonalization of others, the
four females in the audio-discussion, than
participants in the control condition.

PD game response
The cooperative response A was computed as
1 and the competitive response B was computed
as 2. The mean difference in PD game response
between the accent and control conditions was
compared by t test and it was not significant
(Mccent = 1.46 vs Mcontrol = 1.57,p >.20).
Bonus money allocation
The mean difference in the amount of money
allocated to participants themselves was
compared by t test across conditions and it was
not significant (Maccent = 62.40 vs Meo.„0, = 57.76,
p >.20). None of the results obtained from the
bonus money allocation task were significant.
Depersonalization of self and others
1) Depersonalization of others
a) Implicit measurement: Who said what
Accuracy. The mean accuracy of all 99
participants for the recall test "Who said what"
was 46%, and it was statistically higher than
25%, the chance accuracy rate (M= .46,
SD = .17, t (98) = 12.18, p <.001). Participants in
the accent condition were marginally more
accurate than participants in the non-accent
condition (Maccent = ' 49, SD = .16 vs Mcontrol = - 43,
SD = .18, t (97) = 1.91,p <.10).
Intra-group errors. Total errors consisted of
intra-group errors and inter-group errors. Intragroup errors represented participants' memory
confusion between 'Anne' and `Lynn' and
between 'Kim' and 'Sue.' Inter-group errors
represented confusion between the other pairs of
the four females: {Anne and Kim}, {Anne and
Sue}, {Kim and Lynn}, and {Sue and Lynn} .
Thus, by chance, inter-group errors could be
twice more likely to be made than intra-group
errors by each participant. Since the accuracy

b) Explicit measurement: Intra-group
variability
i) Perceived similarity within a group. As
predicted, participants in the accent condition
perceived the same group members, {Anne and
Lynn} and {Kim and Sue}, significantly more
similar to each other than participants in the nonaccent condition (Maccent= 5.45, SD = 1.10 vs
Mcontroi = 4.60, SD = 1.34, t (97) = 3.43,p <.005).
Perceived similarity within a group increased
due to the presence of salient out-group
membership (see Figure 4).
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ii) Perceived similarity between groups. As
predicted, participants in the accent condition
perceived the different group members, {Anne
and Kim}, {Anne and Sue}, {Kim and Lynn},
and {Sue and Lynn}, significantly less similar to
each other than participants in the non-accent
condition (Maccent = 2.99, SD = .98 vs
= 3.43, SD = .80, t (97) = -2.45,p <.05).
Mcontrol
Perceived similarity between groups diminished
due to the presence of salient out-group
membership (see Figure 4). Together (1b(i) and
(ii)), participants in the accent condition showed
higher depersonalization of others than
participants in the non-accent condition.
2) Depersonalization of self
i) Perceived similarity between self and ingroup members (`Anne' and 'Lynn). Participants
in the accent condition perceived themselves
significantly more similar to 'Anne' and 'Lynn,'
in-group members, than participants in the nonaccent condition (Maccent = 5.29, SD = 1.24 vs
Mcontrol = 4.07, SD = 1.21, t (97) = 4.95, p <.001).
Perceived similarity between self and in-group
members increased due to the accent of outgroup members as expected (see Figure 5).
ii) Perceived similarity between self and outgroup members (`ICim' and `Sue ). Participants in
the accent condition perceived themselves
significantly less similar to 'Kim' and 'Sue,' outgroup members, than participants in the nonaccent condition (Maccent= 2.76, SD = 1.25 vs
Mcontmi = 3.68, SD = 1.28, t (97) = -3.61,
p <.001). Perceived dissimilarity between self
and out-group members increased due to the
accent as predicted (see Figure 5). Therefore,
(from 2(i) and (ii)), participants in the accent
condition showed higher depersonalization of
self than participants in the non-accent condition.
Therefore, all of the methods used to measure
levels of depersonalization showed that
participants in the accent condition
depersonalized self and others more greatly than
participants in the non-accent (control) condition
as expected and that the effects were significant.
Correlations among these methods were
computed (see Table 1). A percentage of intra-

group errors, perceived similarity within a group,
and perceived similarity between groups, all of
which measured depersonalization of others,
were significantly correlated with each other
(p < .001). The first two measures were
positively correlated (r = .57, p <.001), and the
first and third measures (r = -.51, p <.001) and
the last two explicit measures (r =.-63, p <.001)
were negatively correlated. Also, perceived
similarity between self and in-group members
and perceived similarity between self and outgroup members, which measured
depersonalization of self, were negatively
correlated (r = -.76, p < .001). The implicit
measurement using a percentage of intra-group
errors was also significantly correlated with the
measurement for depersonalization of self
(r = .43,p .001; r = -.35, p <.001).
Effects of Depersonalization on PD game
The effects of depersonalization as well as the
accent manipulation on the PD game responses
were examined. Given that the accent
manipulation had no overall effects on the PD
game responses as noted, my original plan to
examine the mediating role of depersonalization
became inappropriate. Instead, a median-split
analysis using a Univariate ANOVA was applied.
Participants were split by the median of the
depersonalization scores measured with a
percentage of intra-group errors in "Who said
what." Participants whose depersonalization
scores were higher than the median (i.e. % intragroup errors > .72, N = 50) were classified as
high-depersonalization individuals, who greatly
depersonalized the four females in the audiodiscussion. Participants whose depersonalization
scores were equal to or lower than the median
(i.e. % intra-group errors < .72, N = 49) were
classified as low-depersonalization individuals.
A univariate ANOVA was performed to
investigate how the high or low level of
depersonalization and the accent or non-accent
manipulation affected participants' PD game
responses, respectively. The results are
summarized in Table 2. High-depersonalization
individuals significantly made more competitive
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PD game responses than low-depersonalization
individuals as predicted (Mhigh = 1.68 vs
Mow= 1.35, F (1) = 19.95, p < .001), when the
effect of the accent manipulation was collapsed.
On the other hand, when the effect of
depersonalization was collapsed, the effect of the
accent manipulation on PD game responses
became significant in an unpredicted direction.
Participants in the accent condition made more
cooperative PD game responses than those in the
non-accent (control) condition (Maccem = 1.46 vs
Mcontroi = 1.57, F (1) = 8.23,p < .01). There was
no significant interaction between the level of
depersonalization and the accent manipulation.
We also carried out a regression analysis for the
type of PD game response, specifying the accent
manipulation and the level of depersonalization
as independent variables, and confirmed the
same results. The coefficient of the accent
manipulation was significant and showed that
the accent condition led participants to act more
cooperatively in the PD game than the nonaccent condition = -.29, SD = .11, p <.05).
The coefficient of depersonalization was also
significant and showed that higher
depersonalization led to more competitive PD
game responses = .519, SD = .25, p <.05). The
interaction between the two independent
variables in the regression was not significant.
The effects of depersonalization of self and
others measured with the other methods were
examined by the median-split analysis with a
univariate ANOVA as well. Only
depersonalization of self, which was measured
with perceived similarity between self and outgroup members, showed a significant effect in a
predicted direction. Higher perceived
dissimilarity between self and out-group
members, i.e. higher depersonalization of self,
led to more competitive responses in the PD
game (Mhigh = 1.60 vs Mow 1.43, F (1) = 5.25,
p < .05). The accent manipulation had a
marginally significant effect on the types of PD
game responses when the effect of
depersonalization of self was collapsed, and also
unexpectedly, participants in the accent condition
showed a higher level of cooperation than

participants in the non-accent condition
(Maccent = 1.46 vs Mcontro, = 1.57, F (1) = 3.46,
p < .10). There was no interaction between the
accent manipulation and the level of
depersonalization of self.
Sex difference
In the non-accent condition, male participants
were relatively competitive in the PD game
(M= 1.78, SD = .42, n = 23), while females were
relatively cooperative (M= 1.38, SD = .50,
n = 26). The sex difference in the types of the PD
game responses in the control condition was
significant (t (47) = -3.00,p < .005). Also, the
control male participants made many more intragroup errors relative to inter-group errors in the
recall test "Who said what" (a percentage of
intra-group errors M= .63, SD = .25) and
showed higher depersonalization of the four
females in the audio-discussion than the control
female participants (M= .46, SD = .28,
t (47) = -2.26,p <.05). No significant sex
differences appeared in the accent condition.
Miscellaneous
There were no participants who had
suspicions about the purpose of the experiment
which could have harmfully affected the results.
The results described above were based on
the data of all 99 participants. I did a
supplementary data analysis after excluding two
participants who did not understand the PD game
instructions and including only participants who
indicated their ethnic background as Caucasian.
There were 86 participants (44 participants in the
accent condition and 42 participants in the
control condition) left for the supplementary
analysis, but it did not yield any conceptually
different results from the results that included all
participants.

Discussion
The present study examined how individuals
would behave differently toward their opponent
in a PD game when it was apparent that the
opponent belonged to a different group from
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theirs (i.e. an out-group) in terms of nationality,
compared to when such a cue was absent.
Accented English was used for the manipulation,
and it provided participants with a salient
indication of their opponent's out-group
membership in the PD game. Due to the salient
out-group membership, it was expected that
perceived inter-group categorization would be
greater and that participants would depersonalize
self and others more, that is, perceive self and
others as group members rather than unique
individuals (Postmes et al., 2002; Turner, 1987;
Van Prooijen & Van Knippenberg, 2000). It was
hypothesized that a higher level of
depersonalization would lead individuals to
behave more competitively in a situation where
they were inclined to win a big monetary award
such as in the last trial of the PD game in the
experiment. Because of the expected effects of
depersonalization, it was expected that
participants who received the salient indication
of the opponent's out-group membership by her
foreign accent would get more competitive (as
opposed to cooperative) toward her in the PD
game and allocate more bonus money to
themselves than participants who did not hear
the foreign accent.
As predicted, the results showed that
participants who heard the foreign accent in the
accent condition depersonalized self and others
more greatly than participants who only heard a
native accent in the control condition. Moreover,
when the effect of the accent manipulation was
collapsed by a univariate ANOVA, a higher level
of depersonalization of self and others, which
were measured with perceived similarity
between self and out-group members and the
types of recall errors respectively, was strongly
associated with higher competitiveness in the PD
game. On the other hand, the accent
manipulation did not have significant effects on
the types of the PD game responses until the
effect of depersonalization was controlled. When
the effect of depersonalization was collapsed by
a univariate ANOVA, it was shown that the
presence of the foreign accent in the accent
condition unexpectedly increased participants'

cooperation in the PD game. Together, the results
suggested that some distinct process(es) other
than depersonalization also arose from the
presence of the foreign accent and affected the
nature of the PD game responses in a direction
opposite from the way depersonalization affected
it. For instance, we can infer that the foreign
accent made participants aware that the opponent
`Kim' was a foreigner and activated their selfpresentational concerns with social desirability
(e.g. "I would not do something unfavorable to a
foreigner, not me."). As a result, the presence of
the foreign accent might have not only led
participants to depersonalize self and others but
also to become nicer toward the opponent 'Kim'
and thus more cooperative. Thus, when the effect
of depersonalization was not collapsed, it was
most likely that more than one process, which
worked in opposite directions in an additive
manner, made the overall effects that the accent
manipulation had on the PD game responses
null.
The prior research that used the minimum
group paradigm indicated salience of inter-group
categorization had a direct effect on the level of
in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Turner,
1985). In the present study, the groups were
distinguished by a social enduring category (e.g.
nationality), and it differed from the minimum
group paradigm, where groups were temporarily
and arbitrarily created in a laboratory. The
present study manipulated salience of out-group
membership and assumed that salient out-group
membership would increase perceived intergroup categorization. It directly examined the
effects of depersonalization of self and others on
the PD game and demonstrated that inter-group
categorization led to in-group favoritism in terms
of increased competitiveness toward an outgroup member when depersonalization of self
and others was heightened.
No significant results were obtained from the
bonus money allocation task that was performed
following the PD game. The majority of
participants allocated about half of the bonus
money, that was worth U.S. $100 in total, to
themselves in both conditions and it might have
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reflected their fairness concern. Since
participants were repeatedly told by the
instructions that the entire situation was
hypothetical, their relatively low involvement
could have been another reason for the null
effects.
While the various methods that measured
depersonalization of self and others mostly
worked, the implicit measurement "Who said
what" (Postmes et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 1978),
which used participants' memory confusion
within a group (i.e. intra-group errors) as a
depersonalization score, turned out to be
particularly useful to measure the level of
depersonalization of others. It was highly
correlated with all the other measures for
depersonalization of self and others. Participants,
who made many more intra-group errors relative
to inter-group errors and thus showed higher
depersonalization of the four females they
listened to, were more competitive in the PD
game. Moreover, male participants in the nonaccent condition were more competitive in the
PD game than female participants in the same
condition, and also showed higher level of
depersonalization measured with a percentage of
intra-group errors, although this is a post hoc
explanation.
The present study only used an Asian accent
for the manipulation. In the accent condition,
therefore, the difference in the four females'
attitudes toward premarital sex was consistent
with an existent stereotype about the two social
groups, which is confirmed by some statistical
evidence (Okazaki, 2002; Tan, 2004). Although
the extent to which their attitudes differed was
held constant across conditions, it is possible that
not only the accent but also the consistency of
the content of their speech with the existent
stereotypes about Asian and American females in
the accent condition promoted depersonalization
among participants more easily than the nonaccent condition. An accent of a different origin
or various combinations of different scenarios
could be used to extend the findings.
Future work should also investigate group
stereotypes, which probably increased with

depersonalization of self and others. Postmes et
al. (2002) found that depersonalized interaction
increased perceived inter-group differentiation
and negative stereotypes toward an out-group.
The present study did not demonstrate whether
negative stereotypes toward an out-group
member were activated when depersonalization
was heightened, or how they directly or
indirectly affected the PD game responses.
Also, the present study did not directly
measure (an) opposing force(s), which arose
from the accent manipulation and increased
participants' cooperation toward an out-group
member in the PD game. It would be important
to investigate in the future what these factors are
(e.g. social desirability, politeness, niceness, etc)
and when they work strongly against
depersonalization. As every individual did not
equally depersonalize the four females by
listening to them in the experiment, we can
expect that there will be individual differences in
the extent, to which they would become selfconcerned with their own reactions toward outgroup members.
The results of the present study showed that
the mere presence of the foreign accent
heightened depersonalization of self and others,
and that elevated depersonalization increased
individuals' competitiveness toward an outgroup member even in the hypothetical setting in
the laboratory, where they did not expect to
receive the real money. Although many of us are
watchful of our own reactions to a person who
belongs to a different social group from ours, it
seems rather hard to avoid depersonalization,
through which we perceive the person as "one of
them." The more obvious the out-group
membership is, the harder it gets to control it,
and our depersonalized perception would lead to
more exploitative behavior in interaction with
the out-group.
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Table 1
Correlations Between Depersonalization Measures
1. Depersonalization of others
a. Implicit measurement "who said what," i.e. a percentage of intra-group errors
b. Explicit measurement: intra-group variability
i) Perceived similarity within a group
ii) Perceived similarity between groups
2. Depersonalization of self
i) Perceived similarity between self and in-group members
ii) Perceived similarity between self and out-group members
N=99
lb(i)

lb(ii)

2(i)

2(ii)

.568**

-.505**

.425**

-.350**

lb(i)

-.652**

.203*

-.188(p<.10)

lb(ii)

--

-.227*

.256*

Measures
la

1a

-.764**

2(i)
2(ii)
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level, p<.001 (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level, p<.05 (2-tailed)
Table 2
Univariate ANOVA: The Effect of Depersonalization on PD Game Response

Depersonalization
High
Low
Total

Accent
PD response n SD
1.63
35 .49
15 .26
1.07
1.46
50 .50

Condition
Non-Accent
PD response n SD
15 .41
1.80
1.47
34 .51
1.57
49 .50

Total
PD response n SD
1.68
50 .47
1.35
49 .48
1.52
99 .50

Note. The cooperative PD game response A was computed as 1, and the competitive
response B was computed as 2. Higher value of `PD response' indicates that participants
behaved more competitively in the PD game.
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Figure I. Choice matrix of prisoner's dilemma (PD) game shown to participants
Kim chooses
A

A

$100, $100

$10, $500

$500, $10

$15, $15

You choose
B

(The amount of money you will get is expressed in bold on the left in each cell, while the amount of money Kim will
get is expressed on the right in each cell.)
If you choose A and Kim chooses A, you will get $100 and Kim will get $100 (left cell at the top).
If you choose A and Kim chooses B, you will get $10 and Kim will get $500 (the right cell at the top).
If you choose B and Kim chooses A, you will get $500 and Kim will get $10 (the left cell at the bottom).
If you choose B and Kim chooses B, you will get $15 and Kim will get $15 (the right cell at the bottom).

Figure 2. History of the PD game responses told to participants
Kim chooses
A

A
You choose
B

In the first two trials, both of you chose B, and therefore you two earned $15 respectively, which is indicated
by the line-shaded cell (the right at the bottom) in the matrix.
On the last four trials, both of you chose A, and therefore you two earned $100 respectively, which is indicated
by the dot-shaded cell (the left at the top) in the matrix.
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Figure 3. Choice matrix of bonus money allocation shown to participants
Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim Kim
$100 $90 $80 $70 $60 $50 $40 $30 $20 $10 $0

$0 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50 $60 $70 $80 $90 $100
You You You You You You You You You You You

Figure 4. Depersonalization of others: Perceived similarity within a group or between groups

■ Accent
5.45

0 Control

i) Within a group

ii) Between groups
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Figure 5. Depersonalization of self: Perceived similarity between self and in-group or out-group
members

■ Accent
0 Control

PerceivedSimilarity ( 1-7 scales)

5.29

ii) Between Self and Out-group

i) Between Self and In-group
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